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INTERVENTION AFTER WEBSTER 
Carl Tobias* 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services throws down the gaunt-
let on the "most politically divisive domestic legal issue of our 
time," 1 imperiling women's progress in securing reproductive free-
dom and power in society. The battle over abortion rights is likely 
to splinter an already deeply divided country. After fierce fighting 
in many statehouses, some legislatures will pass statutes further 
restricting abortion. The major battleground, however, will quickly 
shift to the federal courts, where plaintiffs seeking to protect 
procreative freedom will challenge these measures. Judges, parties, 
and lawyers participating in this litigation will rigorously analyze 
the issues of "substance" that Webster and the new state laws 
implicate-questions involving the Constitution, privacy, women's 
rights, precedent, statutory construction, medicine, science, relig-
ion, and morality. · 
In their haste to evaluate these critical issues, they must not 
overlook the procedural questions and process values at stake. 
Indeed, if certain procedural problems receive insufficient atten-
tion, they may preclude efforts to protect reproductive rights. 
Issues involving intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
24 pose significant difficulties and typify the procedural problems 
that will pervade the anticipated abortion cases.2 Two protracted 
pieces of litigation that challenged restrictive abortion laws passed 
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Jane Baron, Ron Collins, 
Bill Luneburg, and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, to the Cowley Endowment and 
the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support and to Luda Patlakh and Cassie Stankunas 
for processing this piece. Errors that remain are mine. 
l. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3079 (1989) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
2. Rule 24 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to 
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant 
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair 
or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's 
interest is adequately represented by existing parties. 
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted 
to intervene in an action: ... (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the 
main action have a question of law or fact in common . . . . In exetcising its 
discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or 
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. 
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after Roe v. Wade3 illustrate the complications that may ensue. 
TALES OF MODERN ABORTION LITIGATION 
In Diamond v. Char/es,4 the plaintiffs, physicians who provided 
a complete range of family planning services, including abortion, 
attacked the Illinois Abortion Act and, in October 1979, secured 
a temporary restraining order precluding its enforcement. 5 Within 
days, Dr. Eugene Diamond sought to intervene on the side of the 
Illinois Attorney General and the Cook County State's Attorney, 
allegedly to def end his pecuniary and professional interest in 
prenatal patients and his interest as the "parent of an unemanci-
pated minor daughter of child bearing age.' '6 Plaintiffs strenuously 
opposed intervention, asserting that Dr. Diamond lacked any le-
gally cognizable interest in the case and, alternatively, that amicus 
curiae participation would suffice.7 Nevertheless, the district judge 
permitted intervention, allowing Dr. Diamond to file an answer, 
a memorandum, and additional documents. 8 
The trial court partially granted the plaintiffs' motion for a 
preliminary injunction the next month. The governmental defen-
dants and the intervenor appealed. In 1980, the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the lower court determination while directing that several 
other statutory provisions be enjoined.9 On remand in 1983, the 
district judge enjoined twenty-five sections of the Act, including 
its principal operative provisions .10 
The defendants and the intervenor appealed the trial court's 
decision on three major sections, while the plaintiffs cross-appealed 
a fourth provision's constitutionality. In 1984, the Seventh Circuit 
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
4. 476 U.S. 54 (1986). 
5. For the description of the case, I rely substantially on the detailed discussion of 
the litigation in Charles v. Daley, 846 F.2d 1057, 1059-61 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 
S. Ct. 3214 (1989), supplementing that with citation to specific opinions when appropriate. 
6. Id. at 1059. Dr. Diamond or his counsel, Americans United for Life Legal Defense 
Fund, have participated in much litigation challenging Illinois abortion legislation. See, 
e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985), 
and cases cited therein; Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (N.D. Ill.), appeal 
dismissed sub nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff 'd, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 
1979); Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. lll.), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 
582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978), later appeal, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979). 
7. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1059. 
8. Id. at 1059-60. 
9. Id. at 1060; see also Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980). 
10. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1060; see also Charles v. Carey, 579 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. lll. 
1983). 
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ruled in favor of plaintiffs. 11 The Illinois Attorney General and 
the State's Attorney decided against appeal. 12 In February 1985, 
however, Dr. Diamond filed a notice of appeal and jurisdictional 
statement with the United States Supreme Court. The Court granted 
review, the case was fully briefed, and the argument was heard 
the following November. In 1986, the Court dismissed Dr. Dia-
mond's appeal because he lacked the requisite "standing" to pursue 
the case absent the governmental defendants. 13 
The plaintiffs filed two requests for expenses incurred in the 
lower federal court litigation. The district judge awarded substan-
tial fees against the intervenor in 1985;14 the plaintiffs also suc-
cessfully sought from the intervenor significant fees sustained in 
the Supreme Court appeal during 1986.15 After complex, prelimi-
nary skirmishing over whether the intervenor had filed a timely 
notice of appeal, 16 he was allowed to appeal the fee awards to the 
Seventh Circuit, which, in 1988, essentially affirmed the trial court 
determinations. 17 
Thus, after nearly a decade of litigation, the plaintiffs were 
vindicated; much of the time, money, and effort they expended 
were attributable to someone who probably never should have 
been permitted to intervene. The ultimate irony, and a fitting 
epilogue to this Kafkaesque travail, is that plaintiffs who pursue 
future, similar challenges may be unable to recover fees from 
intervenors such as Dr. Diamond in light of the 1989 Supreme 
Court opinion in Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. 
Zipes. 18 
II. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1060; see also Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984). 
12. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1060; see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986). 
13. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1060; see also Diamond, 476 U.S. at 64-71. 
14. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1060-61. 
15. Id. 
16. See Charles v. Daley, 799 F.2d 343, 345-48 (7th Cir. 1986). This aspect of the 
litigation offers interesting insights on the "real parties in interest" in modern abortion 
litigation. The Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund sought to become a defendant 
and to accept any intervenor fee liability because it had solicited intervenor participation. 
See id. at 345. 
17. Charles, 846 F.2d at 1077. The litigation concluded in 1989 when the Supreme 
Court denied the intervenor's request that it review the fee award. Diamond v. Charles, 
109 S. Ct. 3214 (1989). Cf. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852, 
854 & n.I (6th Cir. 1988) (state intervenor alone appealed to circuit court), prob. juris. 
noted sub nom. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 109 S. Ct. 3239, motion 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 39 (J989). 
18. See Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989). See 
generally infra notes 165, 186, and accompanying text (explanation of problems Zipes 
presents). Much litigation challenging Illinois legislation has been nearly as prolonged. See, 
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This scenario is not an aberration. Consider the attack on the 
constitutionality of a restrictive abortion ordinance adopted by the 
city of Akron. In Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City 
of Akron, 19 the district court denied the applicants' requests to be 
appointed guardians ad litem for "unborn children" or "infants 
born alive as the result of legal abortion." Over the plaintiffs' 
opposition, the trial judge did grant the applicants' motions to 
intervene, but severely curtailed their participation by limiting them 
to amicus involvement on nearly all issues.20 Notwithstanding these 
restrictions, the applicants "litigated their claims vigorously," filed 
approximately forty documents, "including at least 14 to which 
plaintiffs had to independently respond .... [and] took an active 
role at trial, occasionally requiring the Court to stop their inquiry 
into areas beyond the permitted scope of intervention. " 21 The 
intervenors fully participated in the circuit court proceedings as to 
which they alone requested rehearing, unsuccessfully petitioned the 
Supreme Court for certiorari, and filed briefs in other litigants' 
consolidated appeals. 22 Although the plaintiffs secured significant 
fees from intervenors, they might be unable to do so today. 23 
These and similar procedural difficulties are likely to attend the 
new abortion challenges. Some problems may even prevent reso-
lution of the substantive disputes. Because intervention illustrates 
the numerous procedural questions that are likely to arise, it 
warrants a thorough examination. 
The first section of this Article briefly examines Webster, prin-
cipally to predict the abortion controversy's future course. The 
analysis indicates that a number of state legislatures may impose 
significantly more restrictive limitations on abortion. In most ju-
risdictions, the focus will swiftly shift to the federal courts as 
plaintiffs seek to invalidate the new measures. The second section 
of the Article examines the intervention questions that are likely 
to arise in this litigation and explores the options available to 
e.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985); 
Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed sub nom., Carey v. Wynn, 
439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979). 
19. 604 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. Ohio 1984). This case, and a number of others in this 
Article, involved challenges to local ordinances. Although the litigation raises some issues 
different from those raised by challenges to state statutes, they are sufficiently analogous 
to warrant similar treatment here. 
20. Id. at 1272. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 1274-75. See also Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. 
Ct. 2732 (1989). 
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address the participatory requests of abortion opponents. The 
second section then evaluates how the federal judiciary actually 
has treated the applications in circumstances identical or analogous 
to those likely to be presented by the next round of abortion cases. 
This evaluation reveals that the application of Rule 24 often has 
enabled abortion opponents to delay the resolution of litigation, 
to prejudice existing parties, and to impose significant costs on 
the civil justice system. Recognizing the considerable potential for 
similar problems to recur, the Article provides guidance for re-
solving requests to participate in abortion challenges and proposes 
that the involvement of intervenors be sharply circumscribed. The 
Article concludes by reflecting on the procedural problems and 
process values that the new abortion litigation implicates.24 
I. WEBSTER AND FUTURE ABORTION LITIGATION 
The Supreme Court relied on the right of privacy and the 
fourteenth amendment to invalidate abortion proscriptions in the 
1973 landmark decision of Roe v. Wade. 25 That opinion and most 
of its progeny have ignited a political controversy that steadily 
intensified during the 1980s.26 The Court's decisions in Roe and 
later cases, which essentially defined a woman's constitutional right 
to choose abortion, nonetheless fostered some public consensus 
about reproductive rights. Although most states have severely 
restricted abortion during the third trimester, they generally have 
imposed no limitations in the first trimester and restrictions of 
varying stringency during the middle trimester. 27 Of course, in a 
nation as complex and varied as the United States, this approach 
to abortion has not been universal; numerous states enacted more 
restrictive legislation. Plaintiffs attacked· practically all of these 
24. Of course, the new abortion litigation will implicate many procedural problems 
and process values that the intervention questions do not, although the intervention issues 
typify in certain respects many of them. It is critical to encourage work on the procedural 
difficulties and process values implicated in abortion litigation that have been neglected to 
date. For one recent valuable example of what I have in mind, see Pine, Speculation and 
Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. 
REv. 655 (1988); see also Symposium on Reproductive Rights, 13 Nova L.J. 319 (1989). 
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
26. The author recognizes that what follows is controversial and truncated; it is meant, 
however, to be a relatively balanced account tailored to the specific issues this piece treats. 
27. For a recent representative compilation, see Comment, State Abortion Statutes 
and Their Compliance with Roe v. Wade: The Battle Continues-Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 917 (1986-87). 
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statutes, and the federal judiciary invalidated many of them. 28 
Much of this litigation raised the intervention problems discussed 
in this Article. 
In short, the federal courts' treatment of burdensome abortion 
regulation following Roe had continued to recognize women's 
reproductive freedom. 29 These decisions encouraged additional at-
tacks on restrictive measures and likely discouraged many states 
from passing overly burdensome legislation. Although there ap-
parently was considerable national consensus on abortion, it has 
unraveled somewhat during the 1980s. The Supreme Court's recent 
issuance of Webster promises to increase divisiveness while leading 
to more restrictive abortion legislation and to concomitant federal 
court challenges. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a four-Justice plurality in 
Webster, upheld prohibitions on the use of public employees and 
public facilities to perform nontherapeutic abortions30 and also 
upheld a requirement that doctors conduct viability tests before 
performing abortions. 31 The plurality found "no occasion to revisit 
the holding of Roe" 32 but disparaged its "rigid trimester analy-
sis. "33 Although characterizing a woman's right to abortion as a 
28. For examples of the Illinois legislation and litigation challenging it, see Charles v. 
Daley, 846 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3214 (1989), discussed supra 
notes 5-17 and accompanying text and infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text; and Keith 
v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985), discussed infra notes 
108-24 and accompanying text. Missouri's experience is similar. See Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3047 n.l (1989). 
29. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 772 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 
416, 426-27 (1983). 
30. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3050-53. The plurality relied primarily on its abortion 
funding precedents, particularly Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). For a thorough, 
recent analysis of Webster, see Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REv. 105 
(1989). 
31. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3054-58. The plurality relied on Missouri's interest in 
protecting potential human life. Correspondingly, it did not "pass on the constitutionality" 
of the "findings" in the statute's preamble, providing that the "life of each human being 
begins at conception" and that "[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health, 
and well-being," primarily because the preamble expressed a value judgment and had not 
been applied to regulate abortion or restrict appellees' activities. Id. at 3049-50. 
32. Id. at 3058. The statute invalidated in Roe criminalized all abortions except to 
save the woman's life, while Missouri premised its measure on fetal viability as the time 
when its interest in potential life must be protected. Id. 
33. Id. at 3056. The Chief Justice described that approach as the type of analysis the 
Court reconsiders when it proves to be "unsound in principle and unworkable itf practice." 
Id. (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)). 
1990) INTERVENTION AFTER WEBSTER 737 
"liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, " 34 the 
plurality stated that Webster's holding clearly will permit some 
governmental regulation of abortion that earlier cases would have 
proscribed. 35 The goal of constitutional adjudication is "not to 
remove inexorably 'politically divisive' " questions from legislative 
processes in which the ''people through their elected representa-
tives" resolve important matters. 36 The Chief Justice chided the 
dissent for suggesting that legislatures in a country in which women 
are the majority would regard the opinion as "an invitation to 
enact abortion regulation reminiscent of the dark ages. " 37 Such a 
view does "scant justice" to legislators and the electorate.38 
Despite the plurality's protestations, invitation is the word that 
most accurately captures Webster's implications. The opinion re-
moves many restraints-practical, political, legal, and otherwise-
on lawmakers, essentially inviting them to enact very restrictive 
measures. 39 Numerous factors enhance the invitation's appeal: the 
plurality's indication that it might reconsider Roe in the future,40 
Justice O'Connor's statement that "there will be time enough to 
re-examine Roe" when a statute's invalidity actually turns on the 
opinion's constitutional validity,41 Justice Scalia's plea that Roe be 
overruled explicitly, rather than effectively,42 and the Court's de-
cision on the day it issued Webster to grant review in the 1989 
term to three new abortion cases.43 Indeed, some legislators may 
be inspired to advocate the most stringent legislation possible in 
the hopes of provoking Roe's reconsideration. Even more cautious 
lawmakers may be tempted to champion relatively restrictive meas-
ures, given the Court's preference for leaving abortion regulation 
34. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058. The plurality acknowledged that certain of the Court's 
precedents and the Webster dissent treated abortion as some type of fundamental privacy 
right. Id. at 3057-58. 
35. Id. at 3058 (citing City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 
U.S. 416 (1983) and Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)). 
36. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. It does so by abandoning Roe's trimester analysis and by converting the prior 
right to abortion into a due process liberty interest that will rarely outweigh the newly 
enhanced state interest in protecting "potential human life." 
40. See Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3056-58. 
41. Id. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.). 
42. Id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.). 
43. The three cases are Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 109 S. Ct. 
3239, motion denied, 110 S. Ct. 39 (1989); Turnock v. Ragsdale, 109 S. Ct. 3239, motion 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 38, motion granted, 110 S. Ct. 532 (1989) (granting joint motion to 
defer further proceedings); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 109 S. Ct. 3240, motion denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 39, motion denied, 110 S. Ct. 317, motion granted, 110 S. Ct. 400 (1989). 
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essentially with state legislatures and its willingness to tolerate 
additional restrictions. Many limitations that formerly restrained 
legislators have been eased and perhaps eliminated. Lawmakers 
now have little reason-other than the force of public opinion-
to prevent them from passing measures that sharply curb repro-
ductive freedom and test the outer limits of constitutionality. 
Predicting all that Webster portends is impossible and fortunately 
unnecessary for the purposes of this Article. Given Webster's 
invitation, the severity and breadth of new abortion regulations 
may be restrained only by their sponsors' creativity. Some statutes 
may be similar to the parental consent provisions at issue in the 
cases to be decided in the Court's 1989 term. 44 Other measures 
will attempt to reinstitute regulation tantamount to that previously 
invalidated, such as laws requiring a husband's permission for 
abortion.45 Additional legislation may be comparatively or wholly 
new, like that prohibiting abortions to be performed because the 
fetus is of an undesired gender. 46 
If the restrictive new measures pass, plaintiffs will attempt to 
invalidate them in federal court. These cases will raise many 
procedural problems, several of which implicate intervention. 
II. INTERVENTION PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
A. Introduction 
· Litigation challenging abortion statutes will present intervention 
questions as the individuals or groups who lobbied for enactment 
of those laws seek to intervene as of right or permissively under 
Rule 24 or to participate as amici curiae. Allowing their involve-
ment would have important implications. Intervenors essentially 
have the rights of parties. They can raise issues for resolution that 
litigants have not, participate in discovery, file motions and other 
papers, introduce direct testimony and conduct cross-examination 
44. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 
109 S. Ct. 3240, motion denied, I JO S. Ct. 38, motion granted, 110 S. Ct. 532 (1989). 
45. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-72 (1976) and Planned 
Parenthood v. Board of Medical Review, 598 F. Supp. 625, 633-42 (D.R.!. 1984) (Rhode 
Island spousal notification provision unconstitutional). Cf. 18 PA. CooE §§ 3203-3220 (1989) 
(requiring spousal notification). 
46. See Ashcroft seeks limit on abortion, The Kansas City Times, Jan. 20, 1990, at 
A-I, col. I (Missouri governor seeks state law prohibiting women from having more than 
one abortion in the state and prohibiting abortions performed for sex selection). But cf. 
Iowa Abortion-Rights Voters Altering Electoral Equation, N. Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1989, at 
Al, col. 5 (Iowa Republicans as a caucus will not push for major abortion restrictions in 
the 1990 session). 
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at trial, and appeal adverse substantive determinations.47 Interven-
ors' involvement may deprive parties of control over their own 
lawsuits, frustrate effective judicial case management, complicate 
the issues to be treated, and delay the prompt resolution of 
litigation. The original parties and the federal courts must devote 
substantial time, money, and effort to intervenors' participation. 
The expenditures can be very onerous, especially for plaintiffs with 
limited resources, such as public interest litigants and those likely 
to be challenging the new abortion laws.48 The presence of inter-
venors also burdens an already overworked federal judiciary.49 
Some of the individuals and groups that have been denied inter-
venor status but who have been allowed to participate as amici 
have required elaborate responses of parties and courts. 50 This 
section of the Article considers the participatory options available 
to the federal judiciary, examines how courts actually have re-
sponded to participatory requests filed in abortion cases, and 
recommends an approach for treating future applications. 
B. A Framework for Analyzing Participatory Possibilities 
Judges asked to permit intervention in the new abortion chal-
lenges have numerous options. Courts can grant or deny interven-
tion of right, permissive intervention, or amicus status. They also 
may impose appropriate conditions on any participation allowed. 
This subsection examines how judges have treated requests lodged 
47. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 
863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988); New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 
732 F.2d 452, 473 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984); 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, 
& M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CrvIL § 1920, at 488 (2d ed. 1986). 
48. For an analysis of litigation costs and financing, public interest litigants, and 
resource disparities between them and other parties, see Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights 
Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-89); Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public 
Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C.L. REv. 745, 754-57, 765 & n.105 (1987). 
49. See Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 287-91 (1989) (discussing "litigation explosion" and burdens civil 
litigation imposes on federal judiciary); cf. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce 
Judicial Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701 
(1978) (evaluating intervention's costs to federal judiciary). 
50. See, e.g., Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487, 497-502 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 623 
F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1980); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 498-
99, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Ryan v. Klein, 412 U.S. 924, vacated sub nom. 
Commissioner of Social Serv. v. Klein, 412 U.S. 925 (1973) (showing elaborate responses 
to arguments by guardians ad !item for "unborn children"). Cf A Husband Fights for 
Family Rights, NAT'L L.J., March 5, 1990, at 13 (intervenors cost plaintiff $50,000 in 
"Baby Klein" case). 
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principally in public law litigation that did not involve abortion. 51 
1. Rule 24(a)(2) 
Rule 24(a)(2) provides that upon timely application, anyone with 
an interest in the subject matter of the litigation shall be permitted 
to intervene if the disposition of the litigation may impair the 
applicant's interest, and the interest is not adequately represented 
by existing parties.52 A number of courts and commentators state 
that applicants must satisfy all four requirements while recognizing 
that they are interrelated. 53 Most of the numerous judges who deny 
intervention enforce the conditions rather rigorously and literally, 
demanding that applicants clearly prove each requirement. Corre-
spondingly, many of the significant number of courts that grant 
intervention apply the criteria more flexibly and pragmatically, 
requiring considerably less of applicants. 54 Judges, whether they 
read the rule narrowly or broadly, rely substantially on the pro-
vision's language, the purposes underlying the 1966 amendment, 
and federal intervention-of-right jurisprudence, which has been 
so mew hat unclear. 55 
Many judges and writers have acknowledged the difficulty of 
precisely defining "interest" as used in Rule 24(a)(2}.56 Numerous 
courts that restrictively interpret the first condition require that 
potential intervenors have a direct, significant, legally protectable 
interest in the litigation's subject matter, often citing the 1971 
51. Public law litigation is a lawsuit that vindicates important social values affecting 
many people. Thus, abortion cases are an important form of this litigation. See Tobias, 
supra note 49, at 279-83 & nn. 54-82 (discussion of public law litigation). 
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), reproduced supra note 2. 
53. See, e.g., American Nat'I Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 146 
(7th Cir. 1989); 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE , 24.07(1), at 
24-50 - 24-51 (2d ed. 1987). 
54. Those viewing the rule broadly argue that the amendment's drafters contemplated 
more flexible, pragmatic application, while those viewing it narrowly claim that less change 
was envisioned. See Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700-01 (D.C. Cir. 1967) and Kaplan, 
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (/), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 403-07 (1967). But see United States v. 36.96 Acres 
of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986) and 
Miller,. Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the "Class 
Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 669-76 (1979). For a sense of the Supreme 
Court's unclear jurisprudence, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.17 (3d 
ed. 1985) and 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1908, at 264-70. 
55. See supra note 54 and sources cited therein. 
56. See, e.g., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178-80 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 7C C. 
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1908, at 263-88. 
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Supreme Court decision of Donaldson v. United States.57 Some 
judges demand that applicants be able to state a claim for relief,58 
while an increasing number of courts requires interests equal to or 
exceeding those required for standing. 59 Judges rarely find that 
prospective intervenors have any interest in defending the consti-
tutionality of statutes when governmental defendants are charged 
by law with doing so. 60 Courts that read the interest criterion 
expansively demand comparatively less of applicants, essentially 
treating interest as a minimal threshold requirement. 61 For instance, 
numerous judges state that the " 'interest' test is primarily a 
practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many 
apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and 
due process. " 62 
Few courts rely on the second criterion of impairment, partly 
because it is so closely related to interest.63 Thus, judges who 
narrowly interpret Rule 24(a)(2) may not reach impairment once 
57. See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 
463 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 
185 (7th Cir. 1982); see also Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971). 
58. See, e.g., Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 
(11th Cir. 1982) (intervenor must be at least real party in interest); Heyman v. Exchange 
Nat'! Bank of Chicago, 615 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1980). 
59. See United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986) (requiring interests exceeding standing); Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (requiring interests 
equal to standing). 
60. For a sense of this judicial reluctance, see American Nat'I Bank & Trust v. City 
of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 146-48 (7th Cir. 1989); Baker v. Wade, 743 F.2d 236, 240-43 
(5th Cir. 1984), rev'd on rehearing, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 
1022 (1986); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 143 (1st Cir. 1982). Cf. infra 
notes 67-68 and accompanying text (invoking similar ideas in context of applying inadequate 
representation requirement). But see Washington State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. 
Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983). 
61. See, e.g., County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1980); Smuck 
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969). These courts often prefer to rely on the 
impairment or inadequate representation requirements. See, e.g., County of Fresno, 622 
F.2d at 436; United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 418-20 (D. Minn. 1972). 
62. This is Judge Leventhal's articulation in Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967). Accord Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1989) 
and Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir. 
1984). 
63. See, e.g., American Nat'I Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 147 
(7th Cir. 1989); 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1908, at 263. 
The impairment criterion has received such treatment despite a 1966 amendment adopted 
in response to a confusing Supreme Court opinion. See Proposed Amendments to Rules 
of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) advisory 
committee's note, 39 F.R.D. 69,109-10 (1966); 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, 
supra note 47, .§ 1908, at 301. 
742 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
they conclude that applicants lack sufficient interest. Correspond-
ingly, courts that flexibly enforce the rule, having found the 
requisite interest, are predisposed to considering it impaired or 
prefer to rely on the inadequate representation condition.64 The 
few judges who depend substantially on impairment generally focus 
on the stare decisis effect of a judgment rendered in the applicant's 
absence. 65 Many courts that restrictively read the requirement find 
this impact insufficient, often stating that applicants can pursue 
separate, subsequent litigation.66 Judges who interpret impairment 
broadly consider adequate the stare decisis effect, apparently con-
cluding that subsequent litigation would rarely succeed and, even 
if it did, multiple litigation would be too costly for the judicial 
system and for applicants. 67 
If an applicant's interests may be impaired, intervention must 
be granted unless the interests are "adequately represented by 
existing parties."68 Many judges who view Rule 24 narrowly, and 
even a number who do not, find governmental representation 
sufficient. Some courts demand that potential intervenors with 
purposes similar to the government show collusion between that 
litigant and the remaining parties, prove governmental nonfea-
sance, or show adversity of interest between the applicants and 
the government.69 A number of judges employ a presumption of 
adequacy when one litigant is charged by law with representing 
applicants, a presumption that can be overcome only with a very 
compelling showing to the contrary. 70 Numerous courts that read 
64. See sources cited supra note 61. 
65. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
66. See, e.g., Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 533 (7th Cir. 1988); 
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). Cf. American Nat'/ Bank & Trust, 865 F.2d at 148; Bethune 
Plaza, 863 F.2d at 533 (stare decisis effect not sufficient when amicus curiae participation 
would suffice). 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826-27 (9th Cir.), cert. 
granted in part, Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 476 U.S. 1157, cert. 
dismissed, 478 U.S. 1030, motion granted, 478 U.S. 1047 (1986), vacated, 480 U.S. 370 
(1987); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 910-11 (D.C. Cir. 
1977), later proceeding, Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
68. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2). The treatment in this paragraph is tailored to the contexts 
the anticipated abortion litigation is likely to present. 
69. See, e.g., Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1133, 1135 (3d Cir. 1982); Liddell v. 
Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1976). 
70. See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1986); 
Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98 F.R.D. II, 16-17 (E.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 710 F.2d 
1040 (5th Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987). The presumption is 
peculiarly applicable in litigation challenging statutes' constitutionality. See, e.g., American 
Nat'! Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1989); United Nuclear 
Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (1st Cir. 1982). 
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the Rule expansively use more lenient tests of inadequacy and 
require less of applicants, scrutinizing closely their interests and 
the litigants' interests. For example, when judges discern any 
possibility of conflict between them, representation is found in-
sufficient.71 Some courts invoke the Supreme Court's pronounce-
ment in Trbovich v. United Mine Workers: 72 An applicant must 
only prove that "representation of his interest 'may be' inadequate; 
and the burden of making that showing should be treated as 
minimal. " 73 
Rule 24(a)(2) also requires "timely application," a command on 
which the accompanying advisory committee note is silent. 74 The 
Supreme Court has directed that the timeliness inquiry focus on 
"all the circumstances. " 75 The lower courts have developed nu-
merous criteria to determine timeliness. Most important are how 
long applicants knew or reasonably should have known of their 
interests before petitioning, the injury to them should intervention 
be denied, and prejudice to existing parties attributable to delayed 
application.76 Judges who treat the condition narrowly emphasize 
harm to litigants, often scrutinizing the reasons proffered for delay, 
any significant passage of time, and applicant prejudice. 77 Courts 
that are more flexible about timeliness stress harm to applicants 
and view sympathetically their excuses for delay while evincing less 
concern about party prejudice and the passage of time. 78 
Courts resolving intervention requests also invoke numerous 
policies derived from sources other than the language of the Rule's 
four requirements. 79 Some judges candidly acknowledge that Rule 
24(a)(2) has a discretionary dimension. These judges clearly exercise 
71. See, e.g., Stringfellow, 783 F.2d at 827-28; Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep't 
of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1984). 
72. 404 U.S. 528 (1972). 
73. Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n.10. See, e.g., Stringfellow, 783 F.2d at 827; Sagebrush 
Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983), later appeal sub nom. Sagebrush 
Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1986). 
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) advisory committee's note. 
75. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973). 
76. See, e.g., Gould v. Alleco, Inc., 883 F.2d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 1989); County of 
Orange v. Air California, 799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 
(1987); Garrity v. Gallen, 697 F.2d 452, 455 (!st Cir. 1983). 
77. See, e.g., United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 865 F.2d 2, 5-6 (1st Cir. 
1989); Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98 F.R.D. 11, 24-25 (E.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 710 
F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987). Cf. Garrity, 
697 F.2d at 458 (undue expenditures of judicial resources relevant factor). 
78. See, e.g., Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1989); Chiles v. 
Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (!Ith Cir. 1989). 
79. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
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that discretion even though the provision's phrasing is mandatory 
in contrast to that of Rule 24(b), which is explicitly addressed to 
judicial discretion. 80 While courts could be criticized for applying 
policies drawn from sources external to the Rule and for injecting 
discretionary elements into what is ostensibly a compulsory deter-
mination, the express and implicit judicial reliance on these policies 
warrants their examination. 
Judges who interpret the Rule restrictively rely substantially on 
the policies that come under the rubric of prejudice to existing 
parties. Such concerns include the litigants' rights to control their 
own lawsuits and the resources they would have to devote to the 
participation of intervenors. 81 Related policies implicate effective 
judicial case management and considerations of judicial economy 
for overburdened courts. Judges who broadly read Rule 24 rely 
most on prejudice to applicants. They also find important the 
applicants' potential contributions to issue resolution-in terms of 
expertise, the submission of new information, the introduction of 
questions litigants did not raise, and the adoption of different 
perspectives on issues in dispute-and corresponding improvements 
in judicial decisionmaking that the input might foster. 82 Moreover, 
courts may want to afford applicants an opportunity to be heard, 
or they may be concerned about governmental accountability or 
public acceptance of governmental decisionmaking. 83 
2. Rule 24(b)(2) 
Applicants typically seek in the alternative permissive interven-
tion under Rule 24(b)(2). This subsection provides that upon timely 
application, a court may allow intervention "when an applicant's 
80. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 991 & 
n.20 (2d Cir. 1984); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1969); 7C C. WRIGHT, 
A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1913, at 375-76. 
81. The most comprehensive judicial exposition of these policies is in the Hooker 
Chemicals opinion. Cf. Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(providing additional valuable analysis). For additional treatment, see supra notes 48-49 
and accompanying text; 3B J. KENNEDY & J. MOORE, supra note 53, at 24-51 - 24-52. 
82. See, e.g., United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 860-62 (7th Cir. 
1985) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986); and Sagebrush Rebellion, 
Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983), later appeal sub nom. Sagebrush Rebellion, 
Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1986). 
83. See, e.g., American Nat'! Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 148-49 
(7th Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J., concurring); New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. United Gas Pipe Line 
Co., 732 F.2d 452, 473-75 (5th Cir.) (Williams, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 
(1984). The public acceptance and accountability ideas have considerable applicability to 
legislative branch decisionmaking, although they have greater application to administrative 
agency decisionmaking. See Tobias, supra note 49, at notes 342-44 and accompanying text. 
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claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or 
fact in common," a requirement that has not changed since 1938.84 
Rule 24(b) leaves the determination to the district judge's discretion 
but prescribes one factor to guide its exercise: whether "interven-
tion will unduly delay or prejudice" adjudication of the parties' 
rights. 85 
Several considerations complicate the analysis of Rule 24(b) 
judicial decisionmaking. One is its highly discretionary nature. 
Another is that precedent is unhelpful, because courts respond to 
the peculiar factors before them in each case.86 Moreover, most 
judicial treatment is very terse. Courts often do not mention the 
Rule's requirements or offer any justification, even allowing res-
olution to go unreported. Nevertheless, it is possible to provide an 
account of permissive intervention decisionmaking premised on 
available sources. 
Many courts that deny intervention of right also reject permissive 
intervention, especially when applicants lack a Rule 24(a)(2) inter-
est. 87 Correspondingly, some courts state that the common question 
of law or fact criterion requires an interest that would substantiate 
a legal claim or defense. 88 Judges employ such approaches even 
though the absence of the term "interest" from Rule 24(b)(2) 
suggests that an "interest" requirement may be inadvisable. 89 Even 
84. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2). Cf. 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra 
note 47, § 1911, at 355-56 (provision unchanged but affected by significant 1966 amendment 
of Rule 24(a)(2)). The timeliness requirement is treated similarly to that for Rule 24(a)(2). 
See, e.g., In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (D. 
Mass.), later proceeding, 716 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1989); Garrity v. Gallen, 697 F.2d 
452, 455 (!st Cir. 1983). 
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2); United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 
191-92 (2d Cir. 1978); 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1913, at 
375-79 (broad district court discretion guided by factor characterized as "principal consid-
eration"). 
86. See 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1911, at 393. 
87. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 884 F.2d 185, 187-
89 (5th Cir. 1989); New Orleans Pub. Serv., 732 F.2d at 463-73. 
88. See, e.g., Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1982); True Gun-
All Equip. Corp. v. Bishop Int'! Eng'g. Co., 26 F.R.D. 150, 151 (E.D. Ky. 1960). Cf. 
Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977) (nature and 
extent of applicant's interest relevant factors). 
89. See 7C c. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1911, at 356-58. The 
Supreme Court may have created some confusion by stating that Rule 24(b) "plainly 
dispenses" with any requirement of a direct pecuniary or personal interest but that it 
demands an interest that would support a legal defense or claim based on the interest. See 
SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 459-60 (1940). Accord 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 76 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
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wheri there is a common question of law or fact, courts can and 
do rely on their substantial discretion to deny permissive interven-
tion. 
Judges, in exercising this discretion, frequently take into account 
numerous considerations, some of which are explicitly included in 
Rule 24(a)(2) or comprise its underlying policies.90 Courts denying 
permissive intervention treat as paramount the Rule's expressly 
stated concern about party prejudice, or they find that prejudice 
and other factors, including judicial economy, warrant denial.91 
Courts granting permissive intervention are persuaded by other 
factors, including the applicants' need to participate or their po-
tential contributions to the case's thorough factual development 
or to the fair adjudication of pertinent legal issues.92 These courts 
may find applicant prejudice dispositive or that it and other factors 
are overriding. Even when the applicants' participation might delay 
or prejudice the parties' rights, neither the delay nor prejudice is 
considered "undue. " 93 
3. Amicus Curiae 
When courts deny intervention of right or perm1ss1ve interven-
tion, they may allow amicus curiae involvement. They often seem 
more willing to grant amicus than party status.94 Judges rarely 
provide any explanation for permitting or rejecting amicus partic-
ipation and occasionally invite such involvement sua sponte. An 
amicus does not become a party to the litigation, is unable to 
present claims or defenses in the suit, and lacks appellate rights. 95 
90. Compare Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirements, discussed supra notes 52-83 and accompa-
nying text, with the requirements listed in United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 
188, 191-92 (2d Cir. 1978); Spangler, 552 F.2d at 1329; In re Acushnet River & New 
Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (D. Mass.), later proceeding, 716 F. Supp. 676 
(D. Mass. 1989). 
91. See, e.g., Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 359 (5th Cir. 1984) (amicus participation 
more expeditious when applicant presents no new legal questions); Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98 
F.R.D. II, 26 (E.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 710 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1983), later 
proceeding, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987). 
92. For a thorough recent example, see Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1023-26. 
93. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 340 F. 
Supp. 400, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(applicant's expertise helpful and participation would not delay or prejudice defendants). 
94. This is true of certain judges whose opinions were analyzed above. See, e.g., Lelsz, 
98 F.R.D. at 26; Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 483, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978). Cf. 7C C. WRIGHT, 
A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1913, at 392 (if intervention is denied, the common 
practice is to allow amicus participation, but even that is sometimes denied). See generally 
Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief· From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963). 
95. See Krislov, supra note 94, at 703, 717-18; 13 J. MOORE, H. BENDIX & B. RINGLE, 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE , 836.03 (2d ed. 1986). 
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The gratit -iS completely discretionary; courts may ignore, and 
frequently do not respond in opinions to, amici submissfons. These 
considerations mean that amicus participation minimizes interven-
tion's disadvantages, such as the risks of prolonging litigation, 
while affording many of its benefits. For instance, judges can 
glean most of applicants' potential contributions to issue resolu-
tion, especially on legal questions, and provide them some oppor-
tunity to be heard.% 
4. Conditioning Participation 
Those applicants allowed to participate as intervenors or even 
as amici can complicate the issues to be resolved, delay the prompt 
disposition of litigation, and impose significant costs on the original 
parties and the judicial system. The advisory committee note to 
Rule 24(a)(2) states, however, that a grant of "intervention of 
right under the amended rule may be subject to appropriate 
conditions or restrictions responsive among other things to the 
requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings. " 97 Many 
judges have recognized the validity and value of structuring par-
ticipation, and numerous courts have imposed conditions on in-
tervenor and amicus involvement.98 For example, they have required 
closely aligned individuals or groups to participate through a single 
representative. 99 Judges also have restricted the participants in 
terms of their status, the claims and issues they could raise, the 
procedures they could invoke, and the stages of proceedings in 
which they could participate. 100 
96. The potential benefits and reduced risks of amicus participation probably explain 
courts' greater willingness to grant it. 
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) advisory committee's note. 
98. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 377-78 (1987) 
(Brennan, J ., concurring) (validity of structuring both types of intervention); United States 
v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 991-93 (2d Cir. 1984) (validity of 
structuring intervention of right and citations to cases doing so); 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER 
& M. KANE, supra note 47, § 1922, at 502-05 (validity of structuring both types of 
intervention). 
99. A valuable example is United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 420 
(D. Minn. 1972), later proceeding, 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn.), remanded, 498 F.2d 1073 
(8th Cir. 1974). Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 
578 F.2d 1341, 1345-46 (10th Cir. 1978). 
100. For examples of the type of restrictive conditions that can be imposed, see 
Stringfellow, 480 U.S. at 373, and Hooker Chems., 749 F.2d at 991-93. Cf. In re Acushnet 
River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1022-23 (D. Mass.), later proceeding, 
716 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1989) (self-imposed conditions to insure permissive intervention 
granted). 
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In short, when plaintiffs challenge restrictive abortion regulation, 
abortion opponents have several means of seeking to participate 
in the litigation, and the federal judiciary will have numerous ways 
of responding. The responses of courts to applications submitted 
in cases identical or analogous to the anticipated abortion cases 
are analyzed below. 
C. Judicial Treatment of Requests To Participate in Abortion 
Litigation ., 
The courts' responses to participatory requests can be difficult 
to ascertain. Discerning what some courts have done is impossible, 
because their decisions have not been reported. For example, courts 
have resolved applications on motion, in memorandum opinions, 
or from the bench. When courts' determinations appear in the 
federal reporter system or are otherwise available, judicial treat-
ment can be quite terse, providing minimal explanation or failing 
to mention disposition. 101 
Nevertheless, it is possible to offer an account of courts' reso-
lution of participatory requests by consulting the numerous deci-
sions that have been reported or are otherwise available. 102 These 
sources indicate that a majority of courts has refused to permit 
intervention of right, although a significant number of judges has 
granted such intervention or allowed permissive intervention. More 
courts have permitted amicus curiae participation. 103 
1. Judicial Treatment Denying Participation 
Numerous courts rejecting requests to participate have offered 
comparatively thorough explanations for their determinations, per-
haps attempting to justify the denials. 104 Judges rejecting petitions 
101. For example, "[t]he District Court did not indicate whether the intervention was 
permissive or as of right and it did not describe how Diamond's interests" satisfied the 
requirements of Rule 24. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 58 (1986). Cf. Keith v. Daley, 
764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985) (district judge denied 
intervention motion without written opinion). 
102. This account is premised on determinations that appeared in the federal reporter 
system or were available on LEXIS since 1975 and, thus, could be skewed by inaccessible 
decisionmaking. Cf. Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, supra note 48, at 489-91 
(similar methodology and cautions in context of analyzing decisionmaking involving Rule 
11 sanctions). 
103. These obviously are approximations and subject to the caution mentioned supra 
note 102. 
104. These courts appear more willing than judges granting requests to reduce to written 
form and to report their determinations, which also are more expansive. See infra notes 
146-59 and accompanying text. 
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to intervene of right generally have found that applicants lacked 
sufficient interest in the subject matter of the litigation and that, 
even if they possessed the requisite interest, the governmental 
defendants were adequate representatives. 105 In exercising their 
substantial discretion to deny permissive intervention, courts gen-
erally have determined that the applicants' defenses lacked any 
question of law or fact in common with the main action, and that 
if there were such a question, the prejudice to existing parties, or 
prejudice and other factors, outweighed the need for interven-
tion.106 
The Seventh Circuit case of Keith v. Daley101 is similar to the 
anticipated abortion litigation. It affords the most comprehensive 
federal court examination of the relevant issues and exemplifies 
much pertinent judicial treatment. The majority and concurring 
Supreme Court opinions in the closely related case of Diamond v. 
Charles, 108 discussed earlier, also offer insight into likely judicial 
treatment of procedural issues in future abortion litigation. 
105. There is an important conceptual link between the two requirements in the context 
of abortion. Compare supra note 60 and accompanying text with supra notes 70-73 and 
accompanying text. 
106. Courts seem to recite a standard litany. See, e.g., infra notes 123-25, 143-44 and 
accompanying text. I found no opinions explicitly denying amicus participation, while many 
courts rejecting intervention granted amicus status or suggested it was appropriate. See, 
e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 78 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 980 (1985); Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 483, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The over-
whelming majority of courts has rejected applicants' requests to be appointed guardian ad 
!item for "unborn children." See, e.g., Roe, 464 F. Supp. at 486-87 (unborn children not 
persons with a legally protectable interest within meaning of Rule 24(a)(2) and the appoint-
ment of guardians ad /item neither warranted nor required). More terse rejections are 
reported in Diamond, 476 U.S. at 58; Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 
604 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 & n.4 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1000 
(N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 
193 (7th Cir. 1979). Cf. Turnock v. Ragsdale, 110 S. Ct. 38 (denial of motion for leave 
to represent children unborn and born alive), motion granted, 110 S. Ct. 532 (1989); McRae 
v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (responding to guardian petition by 
granting intervention to make contentions for "unborn class" but rejecting substantive 
arguments), appeal dismissed sub nom. Buckley v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916, vacated sub nom. 
Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977). But see Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 
347 F. Supp. 496, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Ryan v. Klein, 412 U.S. 924, 
vacated sub nom. Commissioner of Social Serv. v. Klein, 412 U.S. 925 (1973) (permitting 
participation by guardian ad litem for "unborn children"). 
107. 764 F.2d at 1265. 
108. 476 U.S. at 54. The interests applicants asserted in Keith and Diamond encompass 
nearly all of the plausible interests that are likely to be alleged in the anticipated abortion 
litigation. See generally infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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In Keith, doctors who performed abortions challenged the con-
stitutionality of restrictive Illinois legislation. 109 The Illinois Pro-
Life Coalition (IPC), a nonprofit organization that advocated the 
measure throughout its consideration in the statehouse, sought to 
intervene of right and permissively on the side of the governmental 
defendants. The district judge denied both requests and the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed those determinations. 110 
The appellate court, in addressing Rule 24(a)(2), stated that a 
prospective intervenor must have a "direct, significant and legally 
protectable interest in the property at issue,'' an interest premised 
on the applicant's own right, not that of existing parties, and one 
so direct that it would support a claim for relief. 111 The circuit 
panel then reviewed all of the interests IPC asserted to determine 
if any met its "direct and substantial interest" test. 112 
The court found insufficient IPC's interests as the chief lobbyist 
for the disputed legislation, its role in promoting restrictive abor-
tion measures, and its need to insure the enactments' proper 
defense when attacked. 113 The appellate judges characterized IPC's 
purpose as "essentially communicative and persuasive" and en-
couraged the "lobbyist" to exercise its first amendment rights to 
persuade others, observing that "such a priceless right to free 
expression, however, does not also suggest that IPC has a right 
to intervene in every lawsuit involving abortion rights, or to forever 
defend statutes it helped to enact." 114 The court added that the 
governmental officials charged with defending or enforcing the 
legislation could be the only defendants in the litigation, implying 
that they alone had sufficient interests. 115 Moreover, the panel 
rejected as "far too speculative" for intervention the Coalition's 
assertion of its members' interest in adopting fetuses surviving 
abortion. 116 The court summarily dismissed IPC's contention that 
the interest requirement must be broadly interpreted in public law 
109. 764 F.2d at 1267. 
110. Id. The trial court granted IPC amicus status, "stating that it would carefully 
consider 'any briefs"' IPC filed. Id. at 1268. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1268-72. 
113. Id. at 1269. 
114. Id. at 1270. Cf. Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care Center v. Arft, 82 F.R.D. 
181, 182 (E.D. Wis. 1979), appeal dismissed, 622 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1980) (voters may not 
claim significantly protectable interest in every ordinance they support so as to entitle them 
to intervene of right in cases challenging its constitutionality). Accord Fox Hill Surgery 
Clinic v. Overland Park, No. 77-4120, Slip op. at 3 (D. Kan. Nov. 9, 1977). 
115. Keith, 764 F.2d at 1269. 
116. Id. at 1271. The panel also found insufficient !PC's interest in protecting '"unborn' 
children," observing that the "state alone ... can assert an interest in the unborn." Id. 
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litigation when public interest groups seek to intervene, proclaiming 
that "Rule 24(a) precludes a conception of lawsuits, even 'public 
law' suits, as necessary forums for such public policy debates" as 
those involving abortion. 117 
The panel, in holding that IPC lacked the requisite interest, 
purported to discuss only that requirement, but it also ref erred to 
the three other criteria included in Rule 24(a). 118 The appeals court 
stated that the IPC had failed to satisfy the Rule's third command 
because the defendants were adequately representing the organi-
zation.119 The court rejected !PC's suggestions that the govern-
mental defendants lacked its "conviction and thorough knowledge 
of the subject area" and that a subjective comparison of applicants' 
and defendants' commitment to the litigation was the proper test. 120 
The panel stated that "adequacy can be presumed when the party 
on whose behalf the applicant seeks intervention is a governmental 
body or officer charged by law with representing" the movants' 
interests, 121 emphasizing that it need not rely solely on the pre-
sumption, as the record indicated sufficient representation, and 
IPC had made no contrary allegations. 122 
The circuit court's affirmance of the district judge's denial of 
permissive intervention was comparatively terse. It observed that 
the decision is entrusted to the trial court's discretion and that the 
determination would be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. 123 
The circuit panel stated that the district judge rejected permissive 
intervention because IPC lacked a "direct claim or right" in the 
117. Id. at 1268, 1270. Accord Arft, 82 F.R.D. at 182. Cf. Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 
483, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (similar general treatment of interest in context of abortion 
funding challenge); Overland Park, Slip op. at 5 (same treatment .of abortion ordinance 
challenge). 
118. The panel found timeliness satisfied and only alluded to impairment in analyzing 
interest and inadequate representation, adding that applicants have the burden of proving 
all four requirements. See Keith, 764 F.2d at 1268. Cf. Overland Park, Slip op. at 7-9 
(helpful treatment of timeliness and impairment in context of abortion ordinance challenge); 
Bossier City Medical Suite, Inc. v. Bossier City, 483 F. Supp. 633, 642-43 (W.D. La. 1980) 
(similar treatment of timeliness, weighing prejudice to existing parties against prejudice to 
applicant). 
119. 764 F.2d at 1270. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. Cf. Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed sub 
nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), aff'd, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979) ("no doubt 
as to the adequacy of the representation" defendant state and county officials would 
provide); Overland Park, Slip op. at 10-12 (governmental expertise relevant factor in 
deciding adequacy of representation in abortion ordinance challenge). 
123. Keith, 764 F.2d at 1272. 
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litigation and to prevent undue delay or prejudice to the parties. 124 
The Court found that discretion had not been abused. 125 
The Supreme Court opinions in Diamond126 are also pertinent 
to the intervention issues the abortion litigation will raise, 127 even 
though Diamond differs from Keith in certain respects. The con-
curring justices determined that Dr. Diamond, who asserted some-
what different interests from IPC but was permitted to intervene 
below, had not been a proper intervenor. 128 The majority did not 
resolve that issue or more specifically, whether such an applicant 
must possess standing, although it did make observations relevant 
to those issues in determining whether Dr. Diamond's interests 
could support a Supreme Court appeal in the defendants' ab-
sence.129 Dr. Diamond's interests were identical to or resembled 
those that have been and will be asserted in many abortion cases. 
In Diamond, physicians who performed abortions attacked the 
constitutionality of the 1979 Illinois Abortion Law. 130 Dr. Diamond 
premised his intervention motion on conscientious objection to 
abortions as well as his status as a pediatrician and as the father 
of an unemancipated minor girl. 131 The district judge, in granting 
the petition, neither described the type of intervention allowed nor 
explained how the physician's interests satisfied Rule 24. 132 The 
intervenor alone appealed to the Supreme Court, 133 after trial and 
appellate courts had permanently enjoined several provisions of 
the abortion statute. 134 The majority dismissed the appeal for want 
of jurisdiction in the state's absence, because Dr. Diamond lacked 
any judicially cognizable interest in the legislation. 135 
Although the Court relied on the intervenor's lack of standing 
and explicitly refrained from deciding whether an applicant seeking 
to intervene in a district court must have standing, the majority's 
observations, especially regarding Diamond's claimed interests, are 
124. Id. 
125. Id. Cf. Overland Park, Slip op. at 13 (terse denial of permissive intervention for 
"same reasons" as intervention of right). 
126. 476 U.S. 54 (1986). 
127. See id. See generally supra note 108. 
128. 476 U.S. at 71-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
129. Id. at 61-71. 
130. Id. at 57. 
131. Id. at 57-58. 
132. Id. at 58; see also supra note 101. 
133. 476 U.S. at 56. 
134. Id. at 58-61. 
135. Id. at 71. 
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instructive. 136 The Court found insufficient Dr. Diamond's asserted 
interest in the legislation's enforcement because private citizens 
· lack any judicially cognizable interest in the state's prosecution of 
others. 137 It also characterized as speculative his claim that as a 
physician he would have more fee-paying patients if the statute 
were enforced.'38 Moreover, the majority rejected standing prem-
ised on parenthood principally because Dr. Diamond had not 
shown that his daughter was a minor or could not pursue her own 
rights. 139 
Justice O'Connor, writing a concurrence in which Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined, stated that Dr. Diamond had 
been improperly permitted to intervene below .140 She found that 
his alleged interests fell "well outside the ambit of Rule 24(a)(2)" 
as elaborated in pertinent case law, which requires a "direct and 
concrete interest that is accorded some degree of legal protec-
tion. " 141 The concurrence characterized the "abstract interests ad-
vanced [as] less 'significantly protectable' than the interest" 
considered deficient in Donaldson v. United States and emphasized 
that "only the State has a 'significantly protectable interest"' in 
defending the standards of its criminal code. 142 
Justice O'Connor also determined that Dr. Diamond had failed 
to meet the requirement of Rule 24(b) that his asserted defense 
have a question of law or fact in common with the principal 
action. 143 She observed that the operative language requires an 
"interest sufficient to support a legal claim or defense" founded 
on the interest and that Dr. Diamond proffered ''no actual, present 
136. The majority stated: "We need not decide today whether a party seeking to 
intervene before a district court must satisfy ... the requirements of Art. III." Id. at 68-
69. The majority's observations may be compelling for courts that apply the interest 
requirement strictly, but they also may help to define interest for judges who enforce the 
criterion more leniently. See infra text accompanying notes 173-77. 
137. 476 U.S. at 64-65. 
138. Id. at 66. The Court also rejected Dr. Diamond's claim that as a physician he 
had standing to litigate the medical standards that ought to be applied in the performance 
of abortions: "Diamond has an interest, but no direct stake, in the abortion process .... 
Similarly, Diamond's claim of conscientious objection to abortion does not provide a 
judicially cognizable interest." Id. at 67. 
139. Id. The Court also rejected Dr. Diamond's claim of standing to assert the rights 
of unborn fetuses as his prospective patients: "Nor can Diamond assert any constitutional 
rights of the unborn fetus. Only the State may invoke regulatory measures to protect that 
interest, and only the State may invoke the power of the courts when those regulatory 
measures are subject to challenge." Id. 
140. Id. at 71 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
141. Id. at 74-75. 
142. Id. at 75-76. 
143. Id. at 76-77. 
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interest" enabling him to litigate or be sued in a lawsuit sharing 
common questions with the case he sought to enter .144 
2. Judicial Treatment Granting Participation 
Analyzing the reasoning of courts that have permitted partici-
pation is considerably more difficult. Many decisions apparently 
go unreported, and the available opinions can be cryptic. For 
example, some courts granting intervention have not stated whether 
it is of right or permissive. 145 Others have provided only minimal 
explanation for the decisions, failing even to mention Rule 24's 
requirements, much less how they were satisfied. 146 Nonetheless, it 
is possible to glean a sense of judicial treatment by examining the 
available sources. 147 
Most courts allowing intervention of right have applied Rule 24 
flexibly and pragmatically. For example, one circuit judge urged 
that the interest requirement be expansively interpreted in public 
law litigation and considered adequate the applicants' "interest in 
adopting live-born fetuses" because it implicated "fundamental 
issues ... of life and death.'' 148 The judge refused to demand that 
they possess standing or have interests sufficient to be parties. 149 
144. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that the requirement had remained identical since 1938 
and that the "words 'claim or defense' manifestly refer to the kinds of claims or defenses 
that can be raised in courts of law as part of an actual or impending law suit .... " Id. 
Cf. Fox Valley Reproductive Health Care Center v. Arft, 82 F.R.D. 181, 183 (E.D. Wis. 
1979), appeal dismissed, 622 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1980) ("lack of clear legal dispute between 
applicants and plaintiffs" precludes finding that "claim or defense is truly in common with 
legal or factual issues raised" by principal claim and defense). 
145. See supra note IOI and accompanying text. 
146. Diamond is the best example. See supra note 101. There are, however, numerous 
others. See, e.g., Women's Community Health Center v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 544 
(D. Me. 1979); Wynn v. Scott, 448 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd sub nom. Wynn 
v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978), later appeal, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979). 
147. I rely on the same sources as are mentioned supra note 102, although the treatment 
is more general rather than focusing on two major cases. The slightly altered factual 
contexts may explain the results in some cases below. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. 
Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 869 (8th Cir. 1977) (applicants' property 
interest asserted in context of abortion ordinance challenge is the "most elementary type 
of right" Rule 24 protects); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Kempiners, 531 F. Supp. 320, 
323 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (similar treatment of interests of entity providing pregnancy counseling 
and referral services supported by challenged statute), vacated, 700 F .2d 1115 (7th Cir. 
1983). But see Fox Hill Surgery Clinic v. Overland Park, No. 77-4120, slip op. (D. Kan. 
Nov. 9, 1977). 
148. Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985). 
149. Id. at 1272-73 (Cudahy, J ., concurring). Cf. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193, 196 
(7th Cir. 1979) (no persuasive authority suggests intervening defendant's appeal may be 
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Courts have accorded little consideration to the impairment re-
quirement. They seem to find it easily satisfied, apparently rec-
ognizing that a judgment on the constitutional issues would clearly 
impair applicants' interests.1so 
Most judges permitting intervention have been willing to employ 
tests of inadequate representation and corresponding burdens of 
proof that are relatively solicitous of applicants. When scrutinizing 
applicants' interests and those of the government, the courts have 
found sufficient any apparent conflicts or deficiencies. Judges have 
invoked the Supreme Court's comparatively liberal articulation of 
insufficiency and what must be shown while ignoring the pre-
sumption that governmental defendants are adequate representa-
tives.1s1 These courts virtually never mention timeliness, apparently 
because abortion opponents' strong interest in restrictive legislation 
led them to seek intervention soon after the litigation's commence-
ment. Insofar as timeliness entered the judges' decisionmaking, 
they probably considered that prejudice to applicants and their 
potential contributions to issue resolution outweighed harm to 
parties or the judicial system. 
Courts allowing intervention also have relied expressly or im-
plicitly on policy concepts that underlie or implicate Rule 24 or 
are exogenous to it. For instance, one judge found significant the 
magnitude of an applicant's expertise in, and commitment to, the 
abortion question while arguing that its involvement would not 
encumber, but clearly further, the "public interest in wise resolu-
tion of difficult and important issues presented." 1s2 Other courts 
apparently wanted to secure diverse viewpoints, garner information 
that might improve judicial decisionmaking, or afford those who 
expended resources lobbying an opportunity to be heard, especially 
on an issue as controversial and volatile as abortion. 1s3 
dismissed for lack of standing; proper analysis to test whether defendant has sufficient 
interest to appeal is whether court abused discretion in permitting intervention); Citizens 
for Community Action, 558 F.2d at 869 (interest in maintaining property values by defending 
ordinance imposing moratorium on construction of abortion facilities sufficient). 
150. The federal judiciary will be extremely reluctant to reconsider any constitutional 
issues, and a ruling on an abortion statute's constitutionality will be given weighty effect 
even if the prospect of multiple litigation is not strong. See supra note 67 and accompanying 
text. See also Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d at 869 (potential erosion of property 
values in context of abortion ordinance challenge is sufficient impairment). 
151. The best example is Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d at 869-70. 
152. See Keith, 764 F.2d at 1273 (Cudahy, J., concurring). 
153. These factors may well have influenced courts whose decisionmaking is inaccessible 
or terse. They also may have led one court to premise intervention in an abortion funding 
challenge by members of Congress on their citizen-taxpayer status. See McRae v. Mathews, 
421 F. Supp. 533, 540 (E.D.N. Y. 1976), appeal dismissed sub nom. Buckley v. McRae, 
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The federal judiciary has provided practically no explanation 
for grants of permissive intervention or amicus status. Courts 
allowing permissive intervention seemingly found that applicants' 
asserted defenses shared common questions with the principal 
action and that their need to participate was more important than 
prejudice to the litigants or harm to the judicial process. Although 
amicus participation is the preferred form of involvement in abor-
tion litigation, courts have rarely explained the grants, perhaps 
deeming it unnecessary as their decisionmaking is wholly discre-
tionary .154 Amicus participation enables courts to secure most 
benefits the applicants might provide while reducing the potential 
disadvantages, namely delay, that party status entails. 155 
One significant aspect of judicial determinations allowing in-
volvement has been some courts' willingness to impose conditions 
on the grant of participation. The Akron litigation, discussed 
earlier, affords a helpful example. 156 The district judge, perhaps 
aware of the possible complications of intervention, permitted the 
applicants to intervene only in their '' ' ... individual capacity as 
parents of unmarried minor daughters of child-bearing age' '' and 
not as guardians ad litem for "unborn children" or "infants born 
alive as the result of legal abortion. " 157 The court limited the scope 
of intervention, restricting trial involvement, for example, to direct 
evidence and cross-examination pertaining to the intervenors' claims 
as parents. 158 "With regard to any other issues, intervenor-defen-
dants' participation was limited to submission of amicus curiae 
briefs." 159 
In short, some courts have permitted participation by individuals 
and groups seeking to def end restrictive abortion legislation against 
attack. Successful applicants have prolonged the resolution of 
litigation, displacing the original defendants in some lawsuits and 
433 U.S. 916, vacated sub nom. Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977). But see Roe v. 
Casey, 464 F. Supp. 483, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (taxpayer status held too indirect and remote 
to support intervention). 
154. Even courts that seem the least amenable to granting intervention often welcome 
amicus participation. See, e.g., Keith, 764 F.2d at 1268; Casey, 464 F. Supp. at 487. See 
supra text accompanying note 103. 
155. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
156. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1268 (N.D. 
Ohio 1984). 
157. Id. at 1272 & n.4. See generally supra note 106 (judicial treatment of guardian ad 
!item requests). 
158. Akron, 604 F. Supp. at 1272 & n.4. 
159. Id. See also supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (similar approach by courts 
granting amicus participation). 
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continuing the litigation without them in the worst cases .160 The 
intervenors have demanded the treatment of new issues, partici-
pated in discovery, introduced extensive direct testimony, con-
ducted lengthy cross-examination, and filed many papers requiring 
replies of plaintiffs, even when courts attempted to circumscribe 
involvement severely. 161 A few participants who were limited to 
filing amicus briefs nonetheless demanded elaborate responses of 
plaintiffs and judges. 162 Those abortion opponents granted amicus 
or party status have been considerably more likely to delay and 
even obstruct litigation's prompt disposition than to contribute 
significantly to issue resolution. 163 The effects on plaintiffs have 
been equally deleterious when permission to participate has been 
improperly granted. 164 Of course, any type of involvement can 
impose substantial costs on litigants and the judicial system. 165 
Moreover, plaintiffs may be unable to recover attorneys' fees from 
intervenors in a number of the new abortion cases, notwithstanding 
the extent of plaintiffs' success or of intervenors' responsibility 
for prolonging the litigation. 166 That problem is particularly trou-
blesome because evidence of past cooperation between abortion 
opponents and governmental defendants indicates that they could 
plan future litigation in ways that may prevent plaintiffs from 
160. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986). See supra text accompanying 
notes 12-17. 
161. See, e.g., Akron, 604 F. Supp. at 1268. See also supra text accompanying notes 
19-22. 
162. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
163. Remarkably few of the numerous opinions in the federal reporter system or 
available on computer indicated that abortion opponents had contributed anything sub-
stantive to issue resolution. 
164. See Diamond, 476 U.S. 54. Cf. id. at 71, 74-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (Diamond improper intervenor). See supra text accom-
panying notes 4-18. 
165. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. Even unsuccessful applications can 
be costly for parties and judges, although these must be considered part of the fixed costs 
of litigating in federal court. 
166. Plaintiffs may be unable to recover fees if the courts require them to show that 
"intervenors' action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Independent 
Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2736 (1989). The Zipes Court did 
not address, however, whether its standard would apply to intervenors in abortion cases. 
In Zipes, the intervenor was a union seeking to protect its members who would be adversely 
affected by the settlement of a sex discrimination class action suit. The Court stated the 
issue was "only the liability of intervenors who enter lawsuits to defend their own 
constitutional or statutory rights." Id. at 2737 n.4. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court 
also denied Dr. Diamond's petition for a writ of certiorari, allowing to stand a large award 
of attorneys' fees against him. Diamond v. Charles, 109 S. Ct. 3214 (1989). 
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securing any fees. 167 Furthermore, while the total number of re-
quests to participate in post-Roe abortion litigation has been less 
than enormous and those granted have not been overwhelming, 
the future is ominous. Abortion opponents-who may believe 
themselves closer to victory than ever-are unlikely to forgo any 
opportunity to def end restrictive measures, especially when that 
could require trusting their hard-fought victories to the vicissitudes 
of governmental representation. 168 All of these factors mean that 
the federal judiciary, lawyers, and litigants must be fully prepared 
to respond to the participatory requests that inevitably will be 
submitted in imminent abortion litigation. 
D. Suggestions for Treating Participatory Requests in the New 
Abortion Litigation 
The number and strength of arguments against participation are 
clearly greater than those favoring it. Perhaps most persuasive are 
the detrimental consequences experienced by judges, lawyers, and 
parties, even when the courts have consciously attempted to curtail 
involvement sharply. Thus, the federal judiciary should seriously 
consider prohibiting any participation. The complications of party 
involvement should make courts particularly reluctant to permit 
intervention of right or permissive intervention under Rule 24. 
Judges who believe that some participation is appropriate should 
ascertain whether amicus involvement will suffice. Courts allowing 
any type of participation should impose conditions on that grant 
whenever necessary. 
1. Rule 24(a)(2) 
Courts should reject requests to intervene of right, because the 
complications of such participation render it unnecessary and 
inadvisable. Many convincing arguments counsel against interven-
tion of right. These are premised on the language of Rule 24(a)(2), 
its underlying policies, and other policies concerning the fair and 
expeditious resolution of litigation. 
167. Justice Marshall characterized such future cooperation to avoid any fee liability in 
the civil rights context as a "likely consequence" of the majority decision in Zipes. Zipes, 
109 S. Ct. at 2746 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a cogent example of prior cooperation, 
see supra text accompanying note 22. 
168. See generally Tobias, supra note 49, at 329 n.344. Correspondingly, if opposition 
to abortion were a litmus test for the recent appointment of many federal judges as 
numerous observers have asserted, those judges may well be receptive to granting abortion 
opponents' applications. 
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As a general proposition, courts should read the Rule narrowly, 
requiring that applicants clearly satisfy each of its four require-
ments. This approach finds support in the Rule's terminology, in 
the 1966 amendment, and in considerable judicial application. 
Many circuit and district courts, particularly in recent opinions, 
have interpreted the Rule more restrictively. 169 Moreover, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's 1989 admonition against broadly reading Rules 
19 and 24170 in the context of public law litigation111 also supports 
a narrow interpretation of Rule 24. In short, numerous plausible 
arguments may be marshaled in favor of a restrictive interpretation 
of Rule 24. 172 
Those seeking to intervene of right in the anticipated abortion 
litigation will likely lack the requisite interest. Numerous judges 
have narrowly read the language of Rule 24(a)(2) to require that 
applicants show a direct, significant, legally protectable interest in 
the suit's subject matter. 173 Indeed, a growing number of circuit 
and district courts has demanded even more; potential intervenors 
must be able to state a claim for relief or have something equivalent 
to, or greater than, standing. 174 For these courts, any applicant 
who asserts interests similar to those of Dr. Diamond or the IPC 
(in Keith) would lack the requisite interest under their own case 
law and Diamond. 175 Even the significant number of judges who 
apply the demanding, but less stringent, requirement of a direct, 
significant, legally protectable interest should find that potential 
intervenors lack sufficient interest in the litigation's subject matter, 
the constitutionality of a state statute. Individual citizens or groups, 
169. See, e.g., supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. For examples in the abortion 
context, see Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985) 
and Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 71 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
170. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 governs the "joinder of persons needed for 
just adjudication." 
171. In Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2186-87 (1989), petitioners argued against 
the Court's application of Rules 19 and 24 because it would be "burdensome and ultimately 
discouraging to civil rights litigation." Id. at 2187. The Chief Justice responded that even 
were the majority "wholly persuaded by these arguments as a matter of policy, acceptance 
of them would require a rewriting rather than an interpretation of the relevant [r]ules." 
Id. 
172. I am not denying, as the supra text accompanying notes 52-83 makes clear, that 
there are narrow and broad lines of authority. I am saying only that the narrower line has 
been ascendant of late and that it applies with special cogency in the abortion context. 
173. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
175. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text (Supreme Court analysis of Dr. 
Diamond's interest); supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text (Seventh Circuit's analysis 
of IPC's interest). 
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even those that have successfully lobbied for legislation, simply 
have no Rule 24 interest in defending the legislation against attack. 
Only the state and its attorney general, local district attorneys, or 
others empowered to def end or enforce abortion statutes have the 
authority to defend them and the requisite Rule 24 interest. 176 
Even judges who employ expansive approaches to the interest 
criterion may find that the requirement cannot be satisfied. Under 
the broadest articulation of the interest condition-that it is pri-
marily a guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many 
apparently interested parties as is consistent with efficiency and 
due process-such factors as fairness, party control, and expedi-
tious dispute resolution outweigh the participatory needs of appli-
cants with interests as minuscule and attenuated as those of abortion 
opponents. 177 
Courts that find applicants lack the requisite interest have no 
obligation to consider the remaining three requirements of Rule 
24(a)(2). Nevertheless, for judges who doubt that the interest 
condition has been satisfied and for courts that clearly have found 
it met, the other criteria (impairment of interest, inadequacy of 
representation, and timeliness of application) require analysis. 
Courts determining that applicants have little interest would be 
unlikely to consider it impaired, because the impairment condition 
is closely related to the interest idea. Even judges who believe that 
potential intervenors have greater interests may find them insuf-
ficiently substantial to suffer much prejudice. Conversely, courts 
that consider the applicants' interests significant may well find 
them impaired. Those thought to have a Rule 24 interest in 
defending restrictive abortion legislation will appear threatened by 
its challenge, especially because any adverse substantive determi-
nation rendered could be highly prejudicial. 178 
There are many convincing arguments that those seeking to 
intervene of right cannot satisfy the inadequate representation 
requirement. A substantial number of circuit and district courts 
apply a presumption of adequacy when the defendant is a govern-
mental body charged by law with representing the potential inter-
venors. This presumption can be overcome only with a very 
compelling showing of insufficiency. The presumption will be 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 60, 115, 141. See also supra text accompanying 
notes 70 and 13 7. 
177. See supra text accompanying note 62. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist's recent 
rejection of a broad reading of Rules 19 and 24 undermines this and other flexible 
approaches to interest. See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2186-87 (1989). 
178. See supra notes 67, 150, and accompanying text. 
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peculiarly difficult to surmount in the abortion context. State 
statutes authorize or even command attorneys general or others 
charged with enforcing restrictive abortion legislation to def end its 
constitutionality or validity .179 It will be difficult to show inade-
quate governmental representation, especially in areas such as 
constitutional law and statutory interpretation. The presumption 
also enables courts to avoid delicate questions involving state 
officials' competence or their dedication to defending the legisla-
tion.180 Moreover, numerous courts that failed to apply the pre-
sumption found representation sufficient or were reluctant to rule 
that the government inadequately represented the state's citi-
zenry .181 These judges have. employed relatively restrictive tests of 
inadequacy, requiring, for example, proof of governmental non-
feasance or collusion with other parties. 
The peculiar nature of governmental representation, such as 
officials' expertise on the critical issues and the close alignment of 
defendants' and applicants' interests, means that even the courts 
taking a flexible approach to adequacy requirements may determine 
that the requirements have not been satisfied. Even searching 
judicial scrutiny of governmental representation is unlikely to reveal 
any inadequacy. 182 
Courts should find that abortion opponents who fail to file 
intervention requests promptly have not satisfied the timeliness 
condition. Judges should rigorously apply the principal factors 
developed to test timeliness. 183 They must examine closely the 
period that has passed since the suit's commencement and any 
reasons proffered for delay in seeking intervention. The highly 
179. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 14, para. 4, 5 (Smith-Hurd 1963 & Supp. 1989); 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 27.050-27.060 (Vernon 1969 & Supp. 1990). 
180. The ideas in this paragraph have been analyzed at several points in this Article. 
See, e.g., supra note 176 and accompanying text. A finding of "inadequacy" does not 
mean deficiency, but judges may still be reluctant to make that finding in the case of 
governmental defendants, because it implicates delicate relationships between federal courts 
and the state officials. 
181. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. See also supra note 122 and accompa-
nying text. 
182. See American Nat'I Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144, 148-49 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J., concurring); Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir.) 
(Cudahy, J., concurring), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985). 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77. A rigorous application is especially 
appropriate in this context. The notoriety of the abortion issue means opponents will have 
few persuasive reasons for delayed application and little cause to complain. Moreover, 
there is minimal likelihood of a "sudden revelation of a divergence of interests" among 
applicants and defendants, such as the unpredictable settlement negotiations between the 
government and plaintiffs that may occur in other contexts. See, e.g., In re Acushnet River 
& New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (D. Mass. 1989). 
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controversial nature of abortion and opponents' strong commit-
ment to restrictive legislation mean that judges should view with 
circumspection any passage of time, being especially alert to delay 
for tactical purposes. Courts also should be particularly sensitive 
to the potential for prejudicing existing parties and for imposing 
costs on the judicial system, finding applications untimely on these 
bases alone. 184 Judges should also find that any significant diffi-
culties for the litigants or for courts outweigh such factors as 
prejudice to applicants and their potential contributions to issue 
resolution. The potential for delay to harm parties and the judicial 
system should be compelling when there has been any passage of 
time, especially in light of applicants' minimal interests and the 
concomitant prejudice and questionable nature of any excuses for 
delay. 
Numerous policies that directly underlie or relate to Rule 24(a)(2) 
also warrant denial of requests to intervene of right. Perhaps most 
important is the possibility of prejudice to existing parties. The 
active involvement of intervenors could deprive litigants of control 
over their cases. Considerable time, money, and effort may be 
consumed in responding to issues that intervenors raise, to their 
direct testimony and cross-examination, and to their appeals. Cor-
respondingly, federal courts will have to devote significant re-
sources to intervenors' participation. 
In comparison, the need for applicants' participation as parties 
in this context is relatively insubstantial. 185 The central issues in 
the anticipated abortion litigation-which will overwhelmingly in-
volve constitutional questions, statutory interpretation, and legis-
lative intent-require limited factual development and can be 
efficaciously treated through the submission of amicus briefs. 
Concomitantly, applicants are not likely to have much relevant 
expertise or many new ideas to contribute to issue resolution, or 
to improve judicial decisionmaking, especially in light of govern-
mental defendants' effective representation and the minimal value 
of abortion opponents' input in past cases. Denying intervenor 
status also will cause little loss in terms of the public values at 
stake in this litigation. Abortion opponents will already have had 
an ample opportunity to be heard in the legislature and to hold 
184. The emphasis on judicial economy is justified by mounting concerns over the 
litigation explosion and the escalating costs of civil litigation, although courts typically do 
not list it among the most important timeliness factors. See supra notes 49, 76, and 
accompanying text. 
185. This discussion of policy, in both organizational and conceptual treatment, departs 
slightly from the rule's requirements. In this paragraph, for example, applicants' minimal 
need to participate is contrasted with party prejudice. 
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elected officials accountable; party participation is unlikely to make 
more palatable an adverse judicial determination. 186 All of these 
policies argue strongly against permitting intervention of right. 
Indeed, Justice Marshall just last term suggested the propriety of 
amicus participation for applicants with interests similar to those 
of abortion opponents. 187 . 
Even judges who flexibly apply the Rule or generally would be 
inclined to grant intervention of right might find these policies 
overriding, especially in conjunction with applicants' comparatively 
weak case for meeting the Rule's requirements. For instance, the 
courts may consider the potential harm to original parties and to 
the judicial system more compelling than the relatively minimal 
need for the applicants' participation. 
2. Rule 24(b) 
Courts also should reject perm1ss1ve intervention requests. A 
number of arguments, some of which are similar to those against 
intervention of right, support denial. Courts should first consider 
the common question of law or fact requirement, which some 
judges state demands an interest sufficient to support a legal claim 
or defense. 188 Thus, courts that doubt the applicants have the 
requisite interest to meet the first condition of Rule 24(a)(2) should 
closely examine the related condition in Rule 24(b). Even if appli-
cants satisfy the requirement, judges can deny permissive interven-
tion when exercising their substantial discretion in light of other 
relevant factors. 
186. See generally supra text accompanying notes 82-83. I realize that these ideas and 
others in this paragraph are controversial and could be criticized. For example, critics could 
argue that, insofar as the central issues in abortion cases involve legal questions and require 
little factual development, the potential for abortion opponents to delay resolution is 
correspondingly lessened. This assertion is undermined by the example of the Akron 
litigation, in which abortion opponents caused significant complications despite the sharp 
limits on their participation. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. At the same time, 
the idea that opponents' interests will not be impaired because they can pursue later, 
separate litigation can be criticized in light of such litigation's limited prospects for success. 
I clearly provide for that possibility, however. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 150, 
178. 
187. See Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2745 n.8 
(1989) (Marshall, J .. dissenting) (citing Diamond and Akron as examples). One reason for 
that suggestion was the possibility of cooperation between successful intervenors and 
defendants to avoid fee liability. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. Judges should 
be alert to this prospect in abortion litigation, which is an additional reason warranting 
denial of intervention requests. 
188. See supra notes 88, 143-44, and accompanying text. 
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Courts should treat as paramount the express command of Rule 
24(b) that they consider whether intervention will unduly delay or 
prejudice existing parties' rights. Judges should analyze closely 
applicants' requests and estimate the time and cost of their in-
volvement, remembering that abortion opponents have substan-
tially complicated numerous earlier cases even when their activity 
was severely circumscribed. If courts believe that there is any 
significant potential for delay or prejudice, denial of permissive 
intervention will be warranted. If judges find that prejudice to 
parties is not compelling, they should balance that factor against 
other pertinent factors, especially the need for judicial economy 
and the potential harm to applicants. Even courts that apply Rule 
24(b) more broadly or are predisposed to allowing permissive 
intervention might exercise their discretion to deny it in the abor-
tion context because they believe that prejudice to parties is over-
riding, or, in combination with other factors, is more important 
than the applicants' need to participate. 
In short, Judge Wyzanski's 1943 exposition on party involvement 
under the 1938 Rule retains considerable saliency: 
Additional parties always take additional time. Even if they have no 
witnesses of their own, they are the source of additional questions, 
objections, briefs, arguments, motions and the like which tend to make 
the proceeding a Donnybrook Fair. Where he presents no new questions, 
a third party can contribute usually most effectively and always most 
expeditiously by a brief amicus curiae and not by intervention.••• 
Numerous courts still recite this passage or apply these ideas in 
resolving intervention questions under the current version of Rule 
24(b )(2). 190 
3. Amicus Participation 
Judges should seriously consider whether there is any need for 
amicus curiae participation. Several abortion cases indicate that 
district courts and litigants have spent significant resources treating 
submissions of amici. 191 They may have raised issues that the 
original parties did not, provided new arguments on questions 
already in dispute, or tendered duplicative or irrelevant material. 
Plaintiffs probably have felt compelled to address many of these 
189. Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 51 F. 
Supp. 972, 973 (0. Mass. 1943). 
190. See, e.g., Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98 F.R.D. II, 22-23 (E.D. Tex. 1982), appeal 
dismissed, 710 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1983), later proceeding, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987); 
British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 71 F.R.D. 583, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
191. See, e.g., cases cited at supra note 50. 
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submissions, regardless of their persuasiveness, lest the ideas con-
vince the court, thereby requiring an unnecessary appeal. Corre-
spondingly, judges may choose to respond to amicus input because 
of fairness considerations or to dissuade defendants from appealing 
decisions. The potential costs to litigants and the judicial system 
could well outweigh applicants' needs. Abortion opponents' "in-
terest" in defending restrictive legislation probably will be capably 
represented by governmental defendants. The opponents' "right 
to be heard" can be satisifed through lobbying before the legis-
lature. Even courts predisposed to permitting amicus involvement 
might find the potential for unnecessary complications overriding 
in the abortion context. 
Notwithstanding those possible complications, some courts may 
be reluctant to deny participation altogether. For these judges, 
amicus involvement is a felicitous solution because it affords 
numerous benefits of party participation while minimizing its dis-
advantages. For example, applicants can have as much impact on 
the constitutional and statutory questions that likely will predom-
inate by submitting amicus briefs. Amicus status also enables courts 
to capitalize on applicants' expertise and their contributions to 
issue resolution, potentially improving judicial decisionmaking. 
Moreover, it affords an opportunity to be heard, albeit truncated. 
Furthermore, amicus participation reduces significantly the possi-
bility that applicants will impose great costs on litigants or the 
judicial system. 
4. Conditioning Participation 
If courts decide that some party or amicus involvement is 
appropriate, they should seriously consider conditioning that par-
ticipation.192 Judges should estimate as precisely as possible how 
participation might impede expeditious dispute resolution and tailor 
involvement accordingly. They may want to limit participation in 
terms of raising new issues, taking discovery or filing motions, 
introducing direct evidence or conducting cross-examination at 
trial, or appealing. 
CONCLUSION 
Intervention exemplifies many procedural questions that courts, 
lawyers, and litigants are likely to encounter in the anticipated 
abortion litigation. Analysis of intervention requests illustrates the 
192. For further discussion of the ideas in this paragraph, see supra text accompanying 
notes 97-100, 156-59. 
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importance of the requirements in the federal rules and other 
authoritative sources, such as Title 28 of the United States Code. 
Application of these factors shows that potential intervenors in 
abortion cases should be permitted to participate, if at all, only 
as amici curiae. A comparatively straightforward interpretation of 
the language of Rule 24(a)(2) demonstrates that abortion opponents 
lack the type of interest required and that governmental defendants 
will adequately represent an:y interest they might assert. Moreover, 
the original parties' need to control the litigation, and the concerns 
of parties and judges about expeditious resolution and effective 
case management are significant. These factors are compelling in 
light of the potential complications raised by intervention, the 
limited need for applicants to participate as parties, and the 
minimal likelihood that they will contribute to issue resolution and 
improve judicial decisionmaking. 
An examination of intervention also identifies additional con-
cerns relevant in the context of abortion litigation. Intervention 
demonstrates how resource disparities among parties and litigation 
financing issues can drive much modern litigation. 193 Abortion 
opponents' attempts to participate cogently illustrate how what 
might seem to be a comparatively obscure point of procedural law 
can assume importance out of all proportion to its apparent 
magnitude. Correspondingly, intervention shows the inseparability 
of process and substance and how process can shade into, become, 
and even dictate substance. Perhaps most striking, the procedural 
effort to intervene in abortion litigation replicates the substantive 
effort of the state to intrude into women's reproductive decision-
making. Finally, intervention illustrates which voices are entitled 
to be, and actually are, heard in federal court, for whom they 
speak and under what conditions, and at what cost on the abortion 
question, the most divisive domestic legal issue of our time. 
193. See supra notes 18, 48, 165-66, and accompanying text. 
